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Over the past three decades agricultural credit 
has received considerable attention in low income countries 
as governments have tried to stimulate output and help the 
rural poor through credit. Recent analyses, however, reveal 
major problems in many agricultural credit programs. Cheap 
credit policies appear to fragment rural financial markets 
so that resources are not allocated efficiently. Low inter-
est rates also undermine the financial integrity of financial 
intermediaries and force them to become highly dependent on 
loanable funds from central banks or external aid agencies. 
Despite the high hopes held for cheap credit as an effective 
way to help the rural poor, recent analyses show that, in-
stead, it increases rather than decreases income concentration. 
In the discussion that follows, we briefly outline four 
ways that financial markets affect income distributions: 
through negative impacts on savers, through leverage, through 
negative real rates of interest, and through defaults. We 
conclude with suggested policy changes that might reduce the 
adverse impact financial markets have on income distributions. 
Impact on Savers 
Cheap credit policies force intermediaries to pay 
low rates on financial deposits. This has a two-fold effect 
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on saver: they receive a lower rate of return than they would 
if higher rates were paid, and intermediaries usually offer 
fewer deposit services. With weak incentives to save, depos-
itors often keep only small deposit accounts and few people 
open new accounts. This may result in deposits being an 
expensive way for the intermediary to mobilize loanable 
funds, despite the low interest rates paid. As a result, 
intermediaries often do not provide deposit services, and if 
they do, the quality of the services are very poor. Inter-
mediaries may even discourage savings deposits because 
cheaper funds are available from the central bank through 
rediscount windows. 
Under appropriate conditions financial savings deposits 
are a major way for low and medium income groups to hold a 
significant part of their assets. This was especially true 
some years ago in Taiwan where the rural poor were given 
opportunities and incentives to expand savings deposits (Ong 
and others). While the rural rich use financial deposits 
for transaction needs, they are too financially sophisti-
cated to hold a large part of their assets in this form when 
interest rates are low. Low interest rates effectively tax 
those who hold these financial assets, the low and the 
medium income groups. Although difficult to quantify, low 
interest rates on savings have a very adverse effect on 
actual and potential incomes of the poor. 
Loan Leverage 
If farmers expect to repay loans and pay positive real 
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rates of interests on loans, they must expect to realize a 
profit from borrowing. Expected gains f~om leverage are the 
driving force behind normal loan demand for productive pur-
poses. Depending on the circumstances, some borrowers will 
realize net gains that exceed their expectations, while 
others will realize less. Those farmers who get con-
sistently high rates of net return from loan use will gain 
in income and assets relative to those who realize low net 
rates of return or who do not borrow. 
If credit were allocated on the basis of expected eco-
nomic returns, and all producers had equal access to loans, 
the equity implications of the benefits from leverage might 
be overlooked. As Gonzalez-Vega points out, however, rela-
tively few farmers in most low income countries receive for-
mal institutional loans. In most of these countries fewer 
than 20 percent of the farmers receive formal loans, and it 
is common for less than one-quarter of the borrowers to 
receive three-quarters or more of the total amount of formal 
loans extended. This result is due to excess demand caused 
by low interest rates. Excess demand forces lenders to 
minimize lending costs by stressing large loans to 
established borrowers with abundant collateral and ample net 
worth. These borrowers may or may not realize the highest 
net returns from the use of borrowed resources. It is just 
as likely that some of the excluded individuals--small 
potential borrowers, those without loan experience, and 
those with less collaterial--may have higher marginal returns. 
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Differential access to credit and the effect of 
leverage can have a substantial impact on income distribu-
tions over time. It is virtually impossible to document the 
actual impact, but Gonzalez-Vega provides a hypothetical ex-
ample that illustrates how powerful the impact can be. He 
discusses a two-producer case where only one has access to 
credit. Initially, both producers have the same net worth, 
and realize the same average returns from investments. If 
the borrower realizes a constant average real return of 25 
percent on investments, pays a real rate of interest of 5 
percent and borrows an amount equal to net worth each year, 
in 5 years he will have more than twice the net worth of the 
non-borrower. In ten years the borrower's net worth will be 
more than 4 times the amount of the non-borrower, and in 20 
years it will be almost 20 times the net worth of the non-
borrower. 
Subsidies Via Negative Real Rates of Interest 
Loans are different from other commodities because cre-
dit carries two prices: nominal and real. The nominal 
price is the loan's contractual interest rate. The real 
rate is the nominal rate adjusted for changes in the 
purchasing power of money. The value of financial instru-
ments is largely tied to their exchange value for real goods 
and services. The purchasing power of these claims declines 
with inflation. If the rate of inflation exceeds the nominal 
• 
5 
rate of interest on a loan, the purchasing power of the loan 
declines between the time it is made and the time it is 
repaid. With negative real rates of interest, purchasing 
power is transferred from lenders (or savers) to borrowers. 
A simple example can be used to illustrate this income 
transfer. Assume a borrower receives a one-year $1,000 loan 
at a nominal 10 percent rate. Also assume that he or she 
uses the loan to buy products that inflate in nominal value 
at a rate of 30 percent during the next 12 months. At the 
end of the year the borrower sells the products for $1,300, 
but only needs to repay the lender $1,100, so he or she ends 
up with $200 in additional purchasing power (or income). 
However, the lender ends up with $1,100 that will only buy 
approximately 80 percent of the goods and services that 
could have been purchased with the original $1,000. Roughly 
one-fifth of the original purchasing power of the loan was 
transferred from lender to borrower because of the negative 
real interest rate. 
Recently, negative real rates of interest have been in 
force in virtually all low income countries. Regionally, 
these problems have been most severe in Latin America where 
the regional, annual weighted average rate of inflation in 
the past few years has exceeded 50 percent. Inflation has 
also intensified in Africa and the Middle Eastern countries 
in recent years. While inflation has been less serious in 
Asian countries, few countries in the region have maintained 
positive real rates on agricultural loans over the past decade. 
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It is difficult to precisely estimate the amount of 
income transferred to borrowers via negative real rates of 
interest. Multiple nominal interest rates are commonly 
applied to agricultural loans in a country and information 
is not available on the volume of loans extended at each 
rate. It is also difficult to determine the economic 
characteristics of borrowers; banks generally maintain 
information on the characteristics of loans not borrowers. 
Because of multiple loans to wealthy borrowers, it is 
incorrect to infer much about borrower characteristics from 
loan characteristics in one institution. It is also common 
for well-to-do borrowers to have outstanding loans simulta-
neously from several lenders. 
Substantial insights into who receives the benefits of 
negative real rates of interest on agricultural loans can be 
gleened from recent research on Brazilian agricultural cre-
dit. This research shows that the magnitude of the subsidy 
is very large and heavily concentrated (Adams and Tommy; 
Araujo, Rego and Wright; Sayad). Because formal agri-
cultural credit in Brazil makes up close to half of the 
total formal loans extended in low income countries, trans-
fers in that country carry substantial weight in worldwide 
transfers. 
Cheap agricultural credit has been the leading edge of 
Brazilian agricultural development policies. From 1960 to 
1970, the real value of formal agricultural loans made each 
year quadrupled (Meyer and others). In the period 1970 to 
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TABLE 1. IMPLICIT INTEREST RATE SUBSIDIES IN BRAZILIAN 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT, 1970-1980 
Credit received 
Deflated!./ 
Annual Implicit 
No. of contracts Nominal inflation subsidy 
Year (thousands) Value Value rate (%) (million US ~pl?_/ 
- - million CR$ - -
1970 1,191 9,248 213,648 19.6 72.5 
1971 1,253 12,870 246,870 19.4 78.0 
1972 1,266 18,669 306,162 15.8 12.2 
1973 1,400 30,334 432,119 15.5 10.6 
1974 1,450 48,273 534,771 34.6 960.1 
1975 1,856 89,997 780,102 29.2 1,023.4 
1976 1,832 130,226 799,030 46.4 2,178.5 
1977 1,722 165,859 713,021 38.8 1,147.3 
1978 1,896 233,942 725,238 40.8 1,618.6 
1979 2,373 448,731 903,380 77 .2 2,843.0 
1980 2,766 859,193 859,193 100.9 31665.3 
Total $ 13,609.5 
Sources: 1970-79 Araujo, PP• 68 and 117 
1980 - Unpublished data Banco Central do Brasil 
~/ Deflated by Index No. 2, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 1980=100 
2/ Average nominal interest rate for operating loans was 15% for the period 1970-78, 
and 18% for marketing and investment loans. In 1979, the rates for operating and 
marketing loans rose to 33%, and 38% for investment loans. Assumed length of loan 
was 9 months, 3 months, and 12 months for operating, marketing and investment loans, 
respectively. Exchange rate June 1980: CR $52.30 = US $1.00. 
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1980, the real value quadrupled again {Table 1). Total 
annual lending rose from about $400 million U.S. in 1960 to 
about $16 billion in 1980. The ratio of agricultural credit 
to value of farm production exceeded one in 1975. Table 1 
shows Brazilian inflation rates during the 1970's. These 
rates are typical of the past three decades. Nominal 
interest rates on loans, however, have been relatively 
fixed, usually resulting in negative real rates. During the 
1970's real interest rates ranged from zero in 1972-73 to 
minus 30 percent for some loans in 1980. The total volume 
of purchasing power transferred from lenders to borrowers in 
the 1970's exceeded $13 billion u.s., and the transfer 
exceeded $3.5 billion in 1980 alone! 
Little data exist on the magnitude of interest rate 
subsidies in other countries. Total loans made in all other 
countries may total about U.S. $20 billion. After Brazil 
the next largest agricultural credit portfolios are in India 
and Mexico with about $6 billion U.S. each. If it is 
assumed that the average real interest rate on all loans 
outside Brazil is about minus 5 percent, then the implicit 
subsidy is about $1 billion, which when added to Brazil 
implies $2 to 4 billion in interest subsidies each year. 
Who is receiving this very large income transfer in 
Brazil? Recent studies show that only about 15 percent of 
the farmers in Brazil receive formal loans in most years. 
Census data in 1970 and 1975 showed that 10 or 11 percent of 
the farmers, those with over 100 hectares of land, received 
• 
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60 to 70 percent of the total value of formal loans extended 
(Araujo). Research in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic 
suggest that this high degree of loan concentration is common. 
Gonzalez-Vega helps to explain why this concentration results 
from the mutual interest of lenders and borrowers. Vogel also 
presents arguments that show why it is very difficult to force 
even nationalized lenders to lessen this loan concentration. 
Loan Default 
In recent years several agricultural credit programs 
have collected virtually none of the loans extended,_ e.g., 
Jamaica, Ghana and Kenya. Default rates of 40 to 60 percent 
are common in many countries. While the financial system 
may eventually collect part of these overdue loans, it often 
happens that 20 to 30 percent of the loans are essentially 
stolen from the lender through nonrepayment. Over the years 
non-repayment of loans has seriously undermined lending 
activities in India, the Philippines, Bolivia, Ghana 
Honduras and a number of other countries. These repayment 
problems can seriously undermine the vitality of financial 
intermediaries. 
In most countries default problems among small 
borrowers often make the headlines. All too often it is 
concluded that it is only the poor borrower who does not 
repay. Poor repayment performance is often rationalized by 
policy makers on the basis of non-repaid loans being welfare 
payments for the poor. At the same time, while it is seldom 
---, 
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publicly reported, it is not uncommon for a number of very 
large agricultural loans to be in default in many countries 
(Boakye-Dankwa). In some cases politicians may force len-
ders to tolerate defaults as a way of allocating political 
patronage to well-off borrowers. Small loans to the poor 
may make up the large majority of the number of loans in de-
fault, but it is not uncommon for a majority of the total 
value of defaulted loans to come from medium and large sized 
loans held by the well-to-do. The relevant measure of the 
income transferred by default is the total amount stolen, 
not the number of thefts. 
The income transfer of defaulted loans is enormous. If 
10% of the $20 billion.!/ in estimated loans made worldwide 
(excluding Brazil) are never repaid, then $2 biliion is 
transferred from lenders to borrowers. 
Conclusions 
Although difficult to document, it is increasingly 
apparent that rural financial markets have a powerful impact 
on the distribution of wealth and income in many low income 
countries. Rapid increases in the volume of agricultural 
loans, inflexible nominal rates of interest, persistent 
inflation, and loan default contribute to the income con-
centration process. It is too often forgotten that all of 
the benefits from loan use are proportional to the amount of 
.!./ Default is not a serious problem in Brazil. 
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credit used • Non-borrowers get no benefit from the leverage 
afforded by loans, get no benefit from negative real rates 
of interest, and cannot default. A large majority of the 
rural poor receive no formal loans, and therefore receive no 
borrowing benefits. Likewise, borrowers of small amounts 
receive small leverage benefits, small income transfers due 
to negative real rates of interest, and are able to take 
only small amounts if they default on their loans. At the 
same time, borrowers of large amounts can receive large 
benefits through leverage, and through negative real rates 
of interest and through default. 
The amount of income transferred through negative 
interest rates and loan defaults is enormous. Together 
these two sources represent $4 to 6 billion in purchasing 
power transferred to borrowers per year. Total lending for 
all agricultural purposes by the World Bank in 1981 was only 
$3.8 billion by comparison. Assistance for agricultural 
credit by donors is a small stream compared to the river of 
benefits transferred to borrowers through these credit 
systems. 
Even under the best of circumstances, it is unlikely 
that financial markets can significantly improve rural 
income distributions. Even if all loan defaults are elimi-
nated, Positive real rates of interest are charged on all 
agricultural loans, and Poor savers are adequately rewarded 
for saving, leverage will always favor the large borrower. 
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It is also unlikely that stringent controls by policy makers 
can ever force lenders to spread their loan portfolios when 
interest rates are controlled. Reducing the default problem 
and increasing the real rate of interest would, however, 
substantially reduce the extent to which financial markets 
worsen income distributions. We conclude that more of the 
resources currently wasted in attempts to assist the poor 
through distorted financial markets ought to be channeled 
elsewhere. Offering attractive savings alternatives is one 
of the main ways that financial markets could consistently 
help the poor. 
-~ 
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Notes 
ll We appreciate the assistance of Charles L. Wright in providing 
some of the data used in this paper. 
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